Achilles is capable of transcending the values of his society by a vision of the absolute honor beyond even life itself. But he also wants to be clear that he is the greatest hero of the Greeks.

—Leo Braudy, “The Longing of Alexander” (36)

REFUSING TO FIGHT THE TROJANS BECAUSE HE WILL NOT COUNTENANCE AGAMEMNON’S COLONIZING SELF-INTEREST, ACHILLES RETREATED TO HIS TENT. All because Agamemnon did not want to give up a woman (Chryseis) and, when he is forced to do so, claims a woman who was part of Achilles’s war bounty (Briseis). Suffering humiliation after injustice is not a fate that proud Achilles will endure, and he responds to this outrage with a signal act: retreat. In this moment, Homer’s “brilliant Achilles,” famed military man and the “greatest hero of the Greeks,” becomes the first celebrity recluse in history (1.10). Achilles is the first figure to give the recluse a (heroic) place in the popular imaginary. We even have a phrase for Achilles’s act, bequeathed to us as an accusation: sulking in one’s tent. This popular expression is used to indict, often harshly, those who quit because they believe they have been unfairly treated. In leveling this charge, we implicitly side with Agamemnon, who accuses Achilles of the most dastardly military act: “Desert, by all means, if the spirit drives you home!” (1.204). As an expression, sulking in one’s tent is ripe for mockery, redolent with puerile imagery, conjuring up scenarios in which spoiled children, obstreperous adolescents, or over-indulged celebrities behave badly because they cannot get their way.

Convinced that Agamemnon has wronged him and has started the war for his own ends, Achilles withdraws not only his formidable fighting skills but also his powerful Myrmidons from the Achaean ranks (1.180–81). Achilles’s memorable refutation, “The Trojans never did me damage, not in the least, / they never stole my cattle or my horses” (1.180–81), reaches across the millennia, echoing in another famous act of military refusal: Muhammad Ali’s refusal to be inducted into the United States military with the defiant pronounce-
ment commonly quoted as “No Viet Cong ever called me Nigger” (Lemert 105–07). These instances of principled withdrawal and defiance of the powers that be culminate in a salient confrontation: Achilles and Ali are ideologically bound in their struggles. Achilles has more in common with Ali than he does with Agamemnon—both are denounced as deserters by the dominant forces in their societies. Remarkably, they even, in their own tongues, speak like each other. The language of principled retreat appears to be a poetics shared by great warriors across the ages. Or, differently phrased, Ali was bequeathed to the counterculture by Homer.

Through this historic sulking was born Achilles the recluse. Even if his retreat could be conceived as righteous indignation, as anger rooted in concern for his men and respect for the enemy, there remains the idiomatic residue of that sulk. What, then, is Achilles the recluse if not the forerunner of Greta Garbo, Howard Hughes, Syd Barrett, and Marcel Proust? These figures, like Achilles, openly courted fame before forswearing it. (An obvious literary exception is Thomas Pynchon, who avoided it from the very beginning.) They were not rejecting the battlefield of the ancients, where mythical lives were saved or lost. But who is to say that the bright lights of Hollywood, the fanfare of the music industry, and the acclaim of the literary world do not take their cue from a renowned warrior who valued honor—his strong sense of being right, especially to repudiate Agamemnon—above all else?

The Iliad’s Achilles, recalibrated by David Malouf’s Ransom, has given us the model—the first literary instance—of the famous withdrawing. Ransom turns more on how the exchange, between Achilles and the Trojans’ King Priam, of Hector’s body for war booty enables both leaders to break out of the political impasse in which they find themselves; in this way, the “ransom” Priam pays for Hector’s body is accorded little political import. However, Malouf’s novel repurposes Achilles as a figure who must be understood, above all, as standing apart from the Achaean world, even the Achaean-Trojan conflict. In the “collaboration” between Homer and Malouf (in which Malouf relies mainly on book 24 of The Iliad), Achilles emerges as a resonant social entity, a war hero who, as a figure of thought, surprises us into a new, singular understanding of celebrity: the figure who wants to be celebrated. Achilles’s desire to be celebrated stems from two incongruent sources: he wants to be recognized by those he respects (Odysseus not least among these) and needed by those who disrespect him (primarily Agamemnon). In this way Achilles apprehends us in our thinking, compels us into, in Malouf’s terms, “second thoughts” about celebrity by retracing celebrity—to the ways in which the ancients celebrated, or failed to celebrate, in critical instances, their heroes—and the thinking of the celebrity (28).

Returned to us in Ransom, a novel that turns the Achaean warrior to a new question, Achilles stands in both these works—Homer’s epic poem animates Malouf’s novel—as a celebrated figure who thinks and, consequently, makes us think celebrity; Achilles presents us with an event in which the hero’s fame is indistinguishable from how celebrity resonates in our moment. Ransom’s Achilles provokes at once a consideration of the thoughtful place of celebrity and the difficulty of thinking celebrity as category unto itself. Because the thinking of Achilles is Malouf’s question rather than Homer’s, this essay derives its critical imperative more from Ransom than from The Iliad. For this reason, it is our Achilles, conceived in contemporary Australia but in no way disconnected from the hero of ancient Greece, who is in sharpest focus here.

Hegelian Haunting

[I]t is precisely the individuals and their deeds and sufferings who really emerge.

—G. W. F. Hegel, “Epic Poetry” (1066)
As Leo Braudy’s work shows, Achilles the imperious warrior was a model for Alexander the Great as an imperial celebrity. “Like Achilles,” Braudy writes, Alexander “wanted fame through conquest and battle.” But different things mattered to Achilles and Alexander. For Alexander, a man deeply conscious of his genealogy, believed that he could achieve transnational fame only by establishing the new in and through its relationality. “In his short life of thirty-three years,” Braudy writes, “Alexander constantly posed, fulfilled, and then went far beyond a series of new roles and new challenges until he himself was the only standard by which he could be measured” (38). Alexander was a keen reader of Homer, “[h]eavily conscious of himself as an inheritor,” and his drive for celebrity—as a colonizer celebrated for the empire he created—depended on his determination to make obscure, forgettable, those who came before, those tied to tradition (39). Alexander sought to do more than displace those whom he had succeeded: he wanted to condemn his predecessors (except Homer’s Achilles and Odysseus) to history, in the most derogatory sense of the term. Alexander’s desire instantiates the historical force of celebrity. The need to be celebrated across an ever-expanding empire offers itself as an obvious rationale, and yet it is capable of surprising us as a social force—we do not, as a rule, see celebrity coming, however much we, in retrospect, assume that we expected it. Despite our protestations, celebrity can catch us off-guard, unguarded against its eruptive or irruptive force, such that the “individuals and their deeds and sufferings . . . really emerge” (Hegel 1066). For Hegel, in his lectures on aesthetics, there is only one way to understand Alexander’s ambition: “Was it not a tremendous sense of self that raised Alexander above his friends and the life of so many thousands?” (1068). Following Hegel, we can say that celebrity is grounded—as it is for Achilles, Alexander, Ali—in a “tremendous sense of self,” a self whose sense of its own public and historic worthiness surprises us, a self whose sense of self, we might even speculate, surprises itself. That is the mark, ever-unreachable, ever-receding, of celebrity: to seek greatness for a self that makes all other selves, no matter their standing in history, insignificant, inconsequential, to relegate them to history while insisting on the celebration of this self before and above all others; a celebrity believes, a priori, that everyone else is unequal to him or her. It is of no concern to the celebrity that vast numbers of the “many thousands”—like Agamemnon—rail against their social inconsequentiality. “Of all the warlords loved by the gods,” Agamemnon vents in Wolfgang Peterson’s movie Troy, “I hate him the most.” Agamemnon understands that his condition is immanence, Achilles’s transcendence. Agamemnon belongs to history; Achilles is history.

Propelled by its own historicity, the Alexandrian self imagines that it can proclaim—and enact—itself sui generis: without precedent, entirely unto itself, measured only by itself. The Alexandrian self, in its self-making, suggests the epistemic instability of the distinction between myth and history; Alexander prefers that the myth overwhelm history and then mutate poetically, as any self-respecting celebrity would, into history. No wonder that Alexander’s great regret was that, unlike Achilles, he had no Homer at hand to script the myth. What every celebrity needs, even more than a publicist, is a historian.

Alexander was forthright about his desire to celebrate himself and to have himself celebrated. There is nothing of Walt Whitman’s utopian democratic impulse about Alexander’s desire to “celebrate himself, and sing himself.” Rather, as Braudy argues, Alexandrian celebrity locates the imperial self (as war hero, as a figure of history, as a figure who makes history) as the declarative celebrity because it stands beyond relationality. Without precedent, Alexander’s celebrity is
constructed out of the determined centering of himself: breaking the lineage that binds him to his royal ancestors, Alexander wants to stand alone in the human imagination of the (ancient) world. And yet the unprecedented can stand apart only in their relation to that which is, Alexander reasons, traditional—that which has and follows precedent, the force of precedent he seeks to invalidate. Finally, Alexander is bound to Achilles (a linking to his liking) as much as he is (against his desire) to the kings he seeks to render historically irrelevant.

If Alexander is an imperial ruler who wants to be known in all places of the empire—to be every place and no place—Achilles, in his retreat to his tent, is a warrior for whom place represents a very particular struggle. Son of a goddess (Thetis) and a man (Peleus, the Myrmidon king), Achilles is at once a man of place—the battlefield—and a man who can find his place nowhere. Angered by Agamemnon, Achilles finds himself (temporarily) without a place in the Achaean military when he withdraws to a place, his tent, that is not his proper place. Only when Hector kills Patroclus is Achilles, spurred by honor and a deep homosocial love ("It was as if he had all along needed this other [Patroclus] before he could become fully himself" [Malouf 14]), compelled out of his improper place and back onto the battlefield. Upon returning to it, however, with the sole intention of avenging Patroclus, the "wrathful" Achilles again finds himself flouting the time-honored code of conduct and contravening the rules of military engagement.

In acting against Hector, the Achilles of Ransom "confounds" those who have long battled with him. Achilles appears transposed out of himself, as though he were against—maybe even in open struggle with—his (former) self. In the process, he has become a stranger even to his Myrmidons:

> They no longer know what authority they are under. He is their leader, but he breaks daily every rule they have been taught to live by. Their only explanation is that he is mad. That some rough-haired god has darkened his mind and moves now like an opposing stranger in him, occupying the place where reason and rule should be, and sleep, and honour of other men and the gods. (Malouf 29)

The reason that this out-of-character Achilles no longer has a place lies in the atrocity he committed against Hector, a slain enemy, an act even Achilles's followers find incomprehensible within their military ethos; as Malouf puts it, "[T]aking a knife from his belt, [Achilles] fell to one knee, and swiftly, as if he had always known that this was what he would do, slashed one after the other from ankle to heel the tendons of Hector's feet" (25). Ever possessed of a mordant irony, Achilles, himself doomed to die because of his single vulnerability, "slashes" Hector at the very part that will be the cause of his own demise. This act evokes the heel by which his mother, Thetis, held him as a baby and so made him vulnerable in only that one place, as she dipped him in the river Styx in her bid to bequeath her son her own invincibility. In the process, another phrase from the ancients entered our vernacular: *Achilles's heel*, our cryptic, poetic name for an individual's unusual vulnerability. The expression registers nothing so much as our surprise—a response to inexplicability, one that is both common to all and, in its extreme articulation, particular to the celebrity. The possessor of an Achilles's heel seems immune to harm in all other, conventional ways. If the idiom of our moment owes such a well-used phrase to someone who lived millennia ago, then we might say that the celebrity recluse has both an inordinately long life and a very strange anatomical source.

This strangeness, furthermore, is laden with irony. As with all ironies, this one is girded by a painful truth, a truth that almost invites mockery. "Swiftness of foot," Malouf
reminds us, is Achilles’s “special distinction among the Greeks: Achilles the Runner” (35). Before his mutilation of Hector’s corpse, the military hero Achilles ran swiftly not toward battle, where his speed—of body and mind—would be an asset to the Greeks but toward the seclusion of his tent. “Achilles the Runner” is transformed into Achilles the recluse, a fighter who runs from battle, who turns deliberately from the terms of Agamemnon’s battle, who runs not because he is afraid of combat (he is nothing if not a heroic warrior) but because he prizes the integrity of battle—consideration for his troops, sharing the bounty according to dangers risked, respect for, mingled with a certain individualized indifference to, the enemy; “The Trojans never did me damage.” By running from, resisting, dishonorable combat, by running in the wrong direction, as it were, Achilles inadvertently runs toward an articulation of celebrity that must first pass through notoriety, then transcend it.

Achilles becomes a celebrity only once he has outdone Agamemnon by securing Achaean victory; he reveals Agamemnon’s, and all of Achaean’s, dependence on his fighting prowess. Celebrity, gleaned here from a contortedly negative Hegelian dialectic, can only be achieved when the self has made itself indispensable to a national (Achilles) or social (Garbo, Hughes) or historico-imaginative (Alexander) project: “The Achaeans cannot win when Achilles retires from the fight; by his defeat of Hector he alone conquers Troy” (Hegel 1068). When the recluse returns (from “retirement,” Hegel might insist) to the battlefield, he “alone” secures a victory so that the celebrity stands, singularly, as a military-popular figure who—because of what he is to his society—commands the right to be celebrated. It is in the name of the celebrity that the Trojan War is commemorated; the event cannot be disarticulated from the celebrated hero. If he fights in the Trojan War, Achilles’s mother, Thetis, promises him (in the film Troy), “[t]he world will remember your name.” As a celebrity, Achilles is proclaimed, is deemed, worthy of being acclaimed and of being publicly ushered into history, into immortality through the poetry of Homer, refigured by Malouf, ingrained in our vernacular.

Achilles’s celebrity, however, is salient not only because of his military feat(s) but also because it demonstrates how celebrity, as a mode of public adulation, historical recognition, and literary inscription, becomes indistinguishable from legend, myth, military lore, and enduring fame. Always haunting Achillean celebrity is the Hegelian categorical. One of the first ways, if not the first, to think Achilles is, perforce, through the epic. Achilles “alone conquers Troy.” The nation (everything) depends on him—without Achilles, Achaean would be in the incompetent hands of Agamemnon, condemned to history. Achilles’s “retirement” threatens all the Achaean people.

No matter how much we trivialize or critique the celebrity, the concept retains its Achillean patina: on him the Hegelian “universal” rests (1068); from him everything stems. Only Achilles can deliver victory; only he, “by his defeat of Hector,” can condemn that enemy to defeat; such is the force of the epic hero. For Hegel, Achilles belongs in the company of the “life and deeds of the Cid on his native soil,” the Ramayana, and Dante’s Divine Comedy (1066). If Hegel’s haunting retains any purchase on our thinking (notwithstanding his universalizing propensities), then it becomes almost impossible to elaborate celebrity without direct recourse to history. Hegel’s theory serves as a critical reminder. What all celebrities want, even if they deny it, is for their lives to be written as epics. In every celebrity, recluse or not, lurks an Achilles.

After all, what is the celebrity but someone striving to emulate the inimitable, proclaiming the self an epic self? Might this desire not be most powerful now, in contemporary celebrities, whose celebrity has
achieved an epic triviality? Would Achilles stoop to haunt the epic trivialities of today? Why would he not, considering his lofty perch? Is he even audible, historically, to these trivialities? Or is he conceivable only in the imagination of a Malouf?

At the very least, we can be sure that it is Achilles's ability to be Achilles that makes him alone worthy of Homer's attention in The Iliad. It is Achilles, Hegel's "particular" individual (1063), who alone is tragically up to the universalist challenge that the epic presents. Homer condemns Achilles from the first word in his epic: "Rage—Goddess sing the rage of Peleus' son Achilles, / murderous, doomed, that cost the Achaeans countless losses" (1.1–2). However much The Iliad draws us toward Achilles by explicating his wrath, we know he is already "doomed"—gone from us, going away from us, made a recluse before he can become, on his own terms, the warrior "retired" to his tent. We know from the opening of The Iliad where Achilles is headed (a violent end) even before we know where he is from. Achilles bears in his visage the "scratches" of "doom" and "murder," observed by the songwriter John Darnielle in his artful reflection on vigilantism, "For Charles Bronson"; Achilles has "cost the Achaeans countless losses." His name is nothing other than death, and it will be "remembered," in Thetis's sense, as the invocation of death—the fateful coming of the arrow that will lodge in his heel, the death wished on him, a death not of his making.

**Figure of Thought**

*Now we must win high honor for Peleus' royal son,
far the greatest fighter among the Argive fleet,
and we who fight beside him the bravest troops*

—Homer, The Iliad (16.318–20)

Achilles is remembered even in—or because of—his dramatic absence from the battle. *Sulking in one's tent* invokes Achilles; it does not require the speaking of his name. Such is the historic resonance of his act. Recluse though he may have been, he cannot withstand the force of his unspoken name. Achilles's name is rhetorically more powerful than its aporia because—and here we join Malouf (who joins us all to Hegel)—we can always hear his name, we can see his tent and imagine him in it. He is in our lexicon; he is rhetorically in us and has been ever since he "retired" so memorably. We activate the silent name—which is never entirely silent—in summoning a moment that then no longer belongs only to us or even only to Achilles. Our summoning is an event made by Achilles; we are (all) in, as much as we are indebted to, his idiomatic language.

Much as Achilles cannot escape his fate, so he cannot run away from his name. Inadvertently, any allusion to Achilles severely restricts our rhetorical options. We are left, in Hannah Arendt's phrase, with a singular mode of address: "Speech then takes the form of praise" (143). We praise Achilles in our everyday use of him, a use that is at once quotidian and singular: we invoke him because he allows us to say what we need in such a way that is not vernacular; Achilles will not countenance the everyday (remembering him belongs to a higher order of language), even as he is evoked and invoked. Achilles demands more: he insists that only "Achilles" will suffice. He compels us to thought through a comprehension that is also an apprehension: only through Achilles can we say what we need to say.

There is, however, another reason why it is appropriate to praise Achilles, one that Arendt and her teacher Martin Heidegger and Alexander's teacher Aristotle would appreciate. Achilles's retreat into his tent stems not only from his sense of being dishonored by Agamemnon. There is also a more profound force at work, one that stipulates precisely why Achilles is out of place among his troops—something that goes beyond the fact of his
violation of Hector and himself, goes beyond offending the Myrmidons’ code of combat. The truth is, as Malouf’s Ransom elucidates, that Achilles has always been out of place among these “men from his home country, clear-spirited and secure in their animal nature” (28). What divides him from the Myrmidons, the “bravest troops,” is signal: they are “unacquainted with second thoughts” (28). Achilles is, before all else, a man of “second thoughts”: he thinks about thinking. Achilles relies on his men and leads them superbly, but he is not of them—he is not in the least like them. His thought also distances him from Agamemnon. For Achilles, second thoughts, and third and fourth ones, are a matter of course. He is most intimately acquainted with second thoughts, not with the first response of the Myrmidon soldier. Everything Achilles does, except possibly for his repeated dishonoring of Hector’s body (which is also his honoring of Patroclus, who, in his turn, does not want to be so honored), is rooted in having second thoughts—not least of all, the ways in which he is prompted to thought (about himself, his self-representation, his honor) by Agamemnon’s treatment of him as a “vagabond” (Homer 16.67).

Achilles thinks about the world, about his place in it, from his aloneness in his tent, where he is “not quite alone” but with Patroclus’s ghost (Malouf 10). He thinks about his remove from the world, which deems him at once a hero and a sulker. More than anything, or anyone, it is the “ghosts,” the ghost that is his dead friend, the ghost that has long since forewarned him of his death and that compels him, in this instance, to thought (7). That is why “his mind, even in its passive state, is the most active part of him” (8). His mind is forever at work, working him into solitude, into violence (against Hector’s dead body), forcing him to think the most important thought: anticipating the fatal moment to come, the moment that can see its own termination, the event that was foretold and cannot be forestalled. For this reason Achilles’s mind roils, is forever engaged with ghosts. Those ghosts have been with him since birth and are now calling him from the beyond; they speak to him of his impending, inescapable doom—that damned Homeric place where we first make his acquaintance. In and through his second thoughts, Achilles instantiates, tragically, the mode of being that Arendt so admired: the turbulent, fateful life of the mind, the mind that can foretell its own death, the mind that can think its own end. Achilles “transcends his society” not only because of his “vision of the absolute honor beyond even life itself” but also because he is a warrior given to thought before giving himself over to battle (Braudy 36).

When Achilles announces his retreat, he allows his “spirit” to drive him “home” to his tent, to his thoughts. Achilles knows what it means to stand outside, beyond, in defiance of his civilization’s social and military order. Achilles knows that the outside, which is of course also the inside (of his tent, of the society to which he is so integral), is the only place from which his particular aloneness or singularity might be achieved—at least as it pertains to the desire for proper, appropriate recognition and just treatment.

Achilles’s withholding, then, both is and is not angry. Offended by Agamemnon’s unwillingness to put the Achaeans’ cause first, Achilles transforms himself from war hero into a thoughtful celebrity; at his core, however, Achilles is like all celebrities, epic or trivial, in that he wants to be needed, always, unfailingly, publicly. He wants to be known to be indispensable to the survival of his civilization. Achilles’s desire for recognition and his desire to be needed converge in his desire for indispensability. The hero’s indispensability to a civilization constitutes an extreme political act—to be not so much the pivot supporting other lives, a civilization’s life, as all that stands between that civilization and the threat of its demise. Achilles’s aloneness, in
which the hero discourses with ghosts, represents a mode of being celebrated in the world that is unimaginable in our instant, media-driven, technological age. Today Achilles's sulking would constitute the stuff of reality TV. In our moment, the celebrity can only hide in full public view—camera always on, blog capturing the self-narration.

Achilles stands, in his discomfiting, disquieting, militant aloneness, as a uniquely powerful celebrity given rare force by Malouf's title. As Hegel reminds us, Achilles's retreat can hold, literally, two civilizations for ransom: that of the Achaeans, who need him in their fight against the Trojans, and that of the Trojans, whose king, queen (Hecuba), and royal family are paralyzed by Achilles's repeated act, day after day, for twelve days and counting, of violence against Hector. In not responding to Achilles's violation of the code, the Trojans reveal their own dishonor. Consequently, the only way Hector's body can be reacquired and afforded a proper burial is for Priam to take the ransom—hence Malouf's title—stripped of the trappings of kingship, accompanied only by a lowly carter as he travels in a simple wagon.

Such is the magnitude of Achilles's standing that it cannot be addressed by human beings. It requires the gods, or, more specifically, the god of the gods, Zeus, to restore these two civilizations to life by authorizing the return of Hector's body upon Priam's payment of ransom to Achilles. When a war hero who is a man of thought acts, the gods are compelled to sanction the force of his action, which disarticulates the existing order of things; it is because of what Achilles will not do that the extant hierarchy is temporarily rearranged. It is proper, then, that we look on Achilles as Arendt would, with "admiring wonder" (143). What more could a celebrity, in any age, want? In our everyday invocation of him, we know him only as a name, but the gods, most assuredly, need no reminding of who—and what—Achilles is: the figure who triumphed over Homeric wrath, the paradigm of retreat and return. The Iliad and Ransom remind us of the language Achilles has given to thinking celebrity.

NOTES
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1. Robert Fagles uses "rage" in his 1990 translation; others have translated the Greek term as "wrath."

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